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In the past several years, there has been increasing public-
ity and outrage over the number of U.S. corporations undergo-
ing corporate tax inversion transactions.1 An inversion transac-
tion is a transaction in which a U.S. corporate parent
reincorporates in a foreign low-tax or no-tax country to escape
U.S. tax liability.2 Though inversions have increased signifi-
cantly in recent years, they are not a new phenomenon. The
first highly publicized inversion transaction took place in 1983
when McDermott International relocated to Panama. 3 In 1994,
Helen of Troy shifted its parent corporation to Bermuda. 4 Since
Helen of Troy, the number of inversion transactions has ex-
ploded.5
* J.D. Candidate 2005, University of Minnesota Law School; B.S. 2002, University of
Wisconsin-Madison. I would like to thank Professor Robert T. Kudrle for his sugges-
tion of this topic, Professors Brett McDonnell and Gregg Polsky for commenting on
an earlier draft, and the editors and staff of the Minnesota Journal of Global Trade
for all of their assistance.
1. See infra note 69 and accompanying text (discussing how many people have
called recent inversion transactions unpatriotic).
2. See infra text accompanying notes 11-20.
3. See Carol P. Tello, The Upside Down World of Corporate Inversion Transac-
tions, 30 TAX MGM'T INT'L J. 161, 167 n.66 (2001).
4. See id.
5. Companies undergoing these transactions include: Triton Energy (1996),
Tyco International (1996), Everest Reinsurance Holdings (1999), Fruit of the Loom
(1999), PXRE Corporation (1999), White Mountain Insurance Group (1999), XOMA
(1999), Applied Power (2000), Transocean (2000), Coopers Industries (2001), Foster
Wheeler (2001), Ingersoll Rand (2001), Global Marine (2001), Nabors Industries
(2002), and Weatherford Corporation (2002). See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, For Haven's
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The primary purpose behind these inversion transactions is
to reduce U.S. tax liability. 6 It is not completely clear, however,
why inversions have increased so significantly in recent years.
One explanation is that increased shareholder turnover leads to
less appreciation in shares, reducing shareholder taxation in the
transactions.7 The recent decline in the stock market also re-
duces shareholder taxation.8 Still another explanation is an in-
creased market acceptance of the practice. 9 While these benefits
may save corporations and shareholders tax dollars, many agree
that inversion transactions harm the U.S. government by reduc-
ing tax revenues.10
This Note presents an overview of the major proposed re-
forms related to inversion transactions, and suggests using U.S.
securities exchange listing standards as a disincentive for corpo-
rations looking to move overseas. Part I describes how inversion
transactions function, and explains the effects of inversions on
inverted corporations, shareholders, and the U.S. government.
Part II discusses a number of reforms proposed by lawmakers
and commentators. Finally, Part III proposes a concerted rule
by the U.S. securities exchanges prohibiting the listing of in-
verted corporations.
I. HISTORY OF INVERSION TRANSACTIONS
A. TAX INVERSION TRANSACTIONS
In general terms, a corporate tax inversion is a transaction
in which a U.S. corporation is reorganized so that a newly-
formed foreign corporation becomes the parent of the corporate
group.1 1 The new foreign parent is usually formed in a low-tax
Sake: Reflections on Inversion Transactions, 27 TAX NOTES INT'L 225, 225 nn.4 & 6-
9 (2002); John M. Peterson & Bruce A. Cohen, Corporate Inversions: Yesterday, To-
day and Tomorrow, 81 TAXES 161, 179 (2003). There have also been numerous
start-up corporations initially incorporated in low-tax or no-tax jurisdictions. See
Peterson & Cohen, supra at 26.
6. See discussion infra Part I.B1.
7. Corporate Inversion Transactions: Tax Policy Implications, 2002 W.T.D.
103-88, 17 (Office Tax Pol'y May 2002) [hereinafter Treasury Report]. For a discus-
sion of shareholder tax liability under inversion transactions, see discussion infra
Part I.B.3.
8. See Peterson & Cohen, supra note 5, at 161.
9. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 5, at 226.
10. See discussion infra Part I.C.
11. See generally New York State Bar Association Tax Section Report on Out-
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or no-tax jurisdiction. 12 Jurisdictions requiring little or no in-
come tax are sometimes labeled "headquarters tax havens,"13
and their number has grown substantially in recent decades. 14
Inversion transactions take place in three primary forms.
In a stock inversion transaction, a newly-formed foreign holding
corporation acquires the stock of the U.S. parent company, and
the U.S. parent becomes a subsidiary of the new foreign par-
ent.1 5 The shareholders then exchange their U.S. parent stock
for stock in the new foreign parent.16 In an asset inversion
transaction, the U.S. parent transfers its assets to a new foreign
parent before being eliminated. 17 As with a stock inversion, the
shareholders exchange their stock of the U.S. parent for stock of
the new foreign parent.1 8 Finally, an inversion may take place
through a "Drop Down Transaction," which is a combination of
bound Inversion Transactions, 2002 N.Y. ST. B. ASS'N TAX SECTION 1 [hereinafter
NYSBA Report] (providing an overview of inversion transactions).
12. Treasury Report, supra note 7, at 4.
13. See Robert T. Kudrle & Lorraine Eden, The Campaign Against Tax Havens:
Will it Last? Will it Work?, 9 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 37, 40-41 (2003). Headquar-
ters tax havens usually offer low-tax or no-tax regimes in order to attract foreign
multinational enterprises (MNEs). See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Treating Tax Issues
Through Trade Regimes, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1683, 1687-88 (2001). Many of these
havens were listed in the OECD's 2000 report identifying harmful tax regimes. See
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Report to the 2000 Minis-
terial Council Meeting and Recommendations by the Committee on Fiscal Affairs,
Towards Global Tax Co-operation: Progress in Identifying and Eliminating Harmful
Tax Practice 17 (2000), at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/61/2090192.pdf (last vis-
ited Oct. 10, 2003) [hereinafter OECD 2000 Report]. The OECD listed the following
countries as tax havens: Andorra, Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Com-
monwealth of Dominica, Gibraltar, Grenada, Guernsey/Sark/Alderney, Isle of Man,
Jersey, Liberia, The Principality of Liechtenstein, The Republic of the Seychelles, St.
Lucia, The Federation of St. Christopher & Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines,
Tonga, Turks & Caicos, U.S. Virgin Islands, and the Republic of Vanuatu. Id.
14. See Kudrle & Eden, supra note 13, at 42. Kudrle and Eden propose addi-
tional reasons for the increase, including the growth of MNEs and improvements in
transportation and communication. Id. at 43. Ronen Palan offers four explanations
behind the recent growth of tax havens: the increasing regulation and taxation in
OECD countries, the critical role of havens in developing financial globalization, cor-
ruption and crime in other countries, and haven jurisdictions' use of haven activity
as a strategy for economic development. RONEN PALAN ET AL., STATE STRATEGIES IN
THE GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 175 (1996).
15. See Treasury Report, supra note 7, at 4; Peterson & Cohen, supra note 5, at
164.
16. See Treasury Report, supra note 7, at 5; Peterson & Cohen, supra note 5, at
164.
17. See Treasury Report, supra note 7, at 5; Peterson & Cohen, supra note 5, at
165.
18. See Treasury Report, supra note 7, at 5; Peterson & Cohen, supra note 5, at
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stock and asset transfers. 19 Whichever form of inversion, the
transaction has no immediate effect on the operations of the
corporation. 20
B. EFFECTS OF INVERSION TRANSACTIONS ON INVERTED
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS
1. Reduction of Corporate Tax Liabilities
While an inversion transaction does not immediately affect
a corporation's operations, it does cause other significant conse-
quences. These consequences stem largely from the overall pur-
pose of an inversion transaction, reducing a corporation's
worldwide tax liabilities. 21 Under Subpart F of the Internal
Revenue Code, 22 a U.S. parent corporation is taxed on income
earned by a foreign subsidiary operation, regardless of whether
the income returns to the United States.23 In order to avoid
double taxation of foreign-source income, however, the United
States provides a tax credit for income taxes paid to foreign
countries. 24 A post-inversion corporation avoids U.S. tax liabil-
ity by shielding foreign operations' income from U.S. income
tax,25 and by deducting interest or royalties paid from the U.S.
subsidiaries to the foreign parent, often called "earnings strip-
ping."26
After an inversion transaction, the U.S. operations of an in-
verted corporation are still subject to U.S. taxes.27 The foreign
operations, however, escape the reach of U.S. taxes. Instead,
the foreign operations of the inverted corporations become sub-
ject to the taxes of the jurisdiction in which they take place and
the jurisdiction of the foreign parent corporation. 28 Because the
19. See Treasury Report, supra note 7, at 5; Peterson & Cohen, supra note 5, at
167.
20. Treasury Report, supra note 7, at 5.
21. See Peterson & Cohen, supra note 5, at 163.
22. I.R.C. §§ 951-64 (1994).
23. Treasury Report, supra note 7, at 11-12.
24. See I.R.C. § 901 (2003); William G. Gale, Notes on Corporate Inversions,
Export Subsidies, and the Taxation of Foreign-Source Income, 27 TAX NOTES INT'L
1495, 1497 (2002).
25. See Lee A. Sheppard, Preventing Corporate Inversions, Part 2, 95 TAX
NOTES 816, 816-17 (2002).
26. See id.
27. Treasury Report, supra note 7, at 12.
28. Id. at 29.
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new foreign parent of an inverted corporation is typically located
in a low-tax or no-tax jurisdiction,29 the inverted corporation is
able to reduce significantly its tax liability on foreign opera-
tions.30
An inverted corporation may also reduce its U.S. tax on
U.S. operations through "earnings stripping."31 Under section
163,32 if an inverted corporation creates indebtedness between
the U.S. subsidiaries and the foreign parent corporation, inter-
est payments from the U.S. subsidiaries to the foreign parent
are deductible for U.S. tax purposes. 33 Thus, an inverted corpo-
ration's U.S. subsidiaries can be loaded up with a disproportion-
ate amount of intercompany debt to decrease U.S. taxes. Earn-
ings stripping is maximized when the foreign parent corporation
is located in a no-tax country with a tax treaty with the United
States, such as Bermuda, because the interest is not taxed in
the foreign jurisdiction.34 While earnings stripping can offer an
inverted company substantial U.S. tax savings, 35 section 163(j)
does limit the allowable deduction. 36 If a U.S. subsidiary's debt-
to-equity ratio exceeds 1.5 to 1, and its net interest expense ex-
ceeds 50% of its adjusted taxable income, section 163(j) limits
the deduction of interest in excess of 50% of adjusted taxable in-
come.
37
Earnings stripping may also be accomplished by transfer-
ring intangible assets, such as patents, from U.S. subsidiaries to
a foreign parent. 38 If a foreign parent in a tax treaty jurisdiction
29. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
30. See Treasury Report, supra note 7, at 29.
31. Id. at 21, 29.
32. I.R.C. § 163 (2003).
33. Peterson & Cohen, supra note 5, at 163. This indebtedness can be easily
accomplished by an inverted corporation, such as by issuing an intercompany note.
See Treasury Report, supra note 7, at 21.
34. Treasury Report, supra note 7, at 22. In the absence of an income tax
treaty, a U.S. withholding tax of 30% is applied to the interest payments. Id. at 24.
Even if the foreign parent is located in a jurisdiction that imposes a tax, there will
be some benefit as long as the foreign tax on the interest income is less than the
value of the U.S. tax deduction for interest payment. Id. at 22.
35. Earnings stripping is the largest component of tax savings in an inversion
transaction on a present-value basis. Sheppard, supra note 25, at 816-17. While
the tax savings on foreign operations take place in the future, savings from earnings
stripping take place immediately. Id.
36. I.R.C. § 163(j) (2003). Section 163(j) was enacted in 1989 in response to
concerns about abuse of section 163.
37. I.R.C. § 163(j)(2) (2003). Any interest exceeding the 50% limit, however,
may be carried forward indefinitely and used in another year. Id.; Treasury Report,
supra note 7, at 23.
38. See Sheppard, supra note 25, at 816-17.
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owns U.S. intangible assets, the royalty payments paid by a
U.S. subsidiary may be deductible for U.S. tax purposes.39
These transactions can raise significant problems if the prices
abuse the "arm's length" standard of section 482.40
By transferring foreign operations to the umbrella of the
foreign parent and performing earnings stripping, inverted
companies can reduce significantly their annual tax liabilities. 4 1
This reduction in tax liabilities may enable inverted multina-
tional enterprises (MNEs) to increase their competitiveness do-
mestically and abroad.42 Because tax liabilities are a substan-
tial cost to corporations, a reduction in taxes helps an inverted
corporation lower its prices and capture a greater market
share.43 This increased competitiveness may also lead to a
"snowball" effect, producing pressure on other corporations to
invert.44
2. Increased Share Price
Inversion transactions may further benefit shareholders of
an inverted corporation by increasing the price of their shares.
Some studies have demonstrated an increase in the share prices
of corporations after the announcement of a planned inversion
transaction. 45 Positive share price reactions may be the result
39. See I.R.C. § 161 (2003); Peterson & Cohen, supra note 5, at 176-77.
40. See I.R.C. § 482 (2003); Treasury Report, supra note 7, at 25. The United
States imposes rules requiring that transfer prices are set as if the transaction was
at arm's length. Gale, supra note 24, at 1497. "Arm's length" refers to a transaction
between two parties who are "not related or not on close terms." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 42 (2d pocket ed. 2001). These rules, however, are difficult to enforce.
Gale, supra note 24, at 1497.
41. Ingersoll-Rand reportedly saved $50 to $60 million in taxes in 2002 as a
result of its inversion. Phyllis Plitch, Activists Engage Ingersoll-Rand About Tax
Haven, WALL ST. J., May 28, 2003, at B6E. Tyco International stated that it saved
$400 million in 2001 because of its inversion. David Cay Johnston, U.S. Corpora-
tions are Using Bermuda to Slash Tax Bills, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2002, at Al. Coo-
pers Industries has stated that it expects its inversion to reduce its annual effective
tax rate by 12-17%. Avi-Yonah, supra note 5, at 226 n.17 (citing Coopers Industries
Proxy Statement (July 27, 2001)).
42. See Ken Brewer, Treason? Or Survival of the Fittest? Dealing With Corpo-
rate Expatriation, 95 TAX NOTES 603, 605-06 (2002).
43. See id.
44. Jonathan Weisman, Patriotism Raining on Tax Paradise; Lawmakers Are
Chafing at Firms that Exist Offshore Only on Paper, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 2002, at
El (stating that Stanley Works considered inverting only after two of its major com-
petitors, Cooper Industries and Ingersoll-Rand, inverted to Bermuda in 1997).
45. See Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines, Jr., Expectations and Expatriations:
Tracing the Causes and Consequences of Corporate Inversions, 55 NAT'L TAX J. 409,
[Vol. 14:1
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of stockholder recognition that after-tax earnings will be
higher. 46  Any price increases, however, appear relatively
small.47 At least one study disputes any positive market reac-
tion to inversion transactions.4S In any event, there is not
enough information to suggest that increased share price cre-
ates a serious motive for corporations to undergo inversion
transactions.
3. Taxation of Realized Gains in Inversion Transactions
Despite the potential benefits, inversion transactions are
not without costs to shareholders and corporations. Depending
on whether the inversion transaction is a stock or asset transfer,
shareholders and inverted corporations may be subject to U.S.
taxes on any capital gains.49 In a stock transfer, under section
367(a),50 U.S. persons are taxed on realized gain when they
transfer appreciated stock from the U.S. corporation to the new
foreign parent. 51 Conversely, shareholders with a loss on the
stock cannot recognize the loss for tax purposes.52 These "anti-
inversion regulations" were adopted in response to early inver-
sion transactions.53 The anti-inversion regulations do, however,
allow for tax-free treatment if certain conditions are met.54
430 (2002); Jim A. Seida & William F. Wempe, The Market's Reaction or Nonreaction
to Corporate Inversions, 96 TAX NOTES 1146, 1149 (2003) (stating that their findings
suggest "investors reacted favorably (on average) to shareholder approvals of pre-
Autumn 2001 inversion transactions").
46. Bruce Bartlett, Why the Inversion Aversion?, available at http://www
.nationalreview.com/nrofbartlett08l2O2.asp (Aug. 12, 2002).
47. See Desai & Hines, supra note 45, at 430 (stating that out of nineteen in-
version transactions studied, stock prices had increased on average by 1.7% over a
five-day period following the inversion announcement).
48. See C.B. Cloyd et al., Market Nonreaction to Inversions, 98 TAX NOTES 259,
259-61 (2003) (arguing that Seida and Wempe's conclusion is faulty and that there
is no significant positive market reaction to an inversion transaction).
49. See Treasury Report, supra note 7, at 7. For a detailed and technical ex-
amination of the tax consequences of various inversion transactions, see Gregg D.
Lemein & John D. McDonald, Taxable Inversion Transactions, 80 TAXES 7 (2002).
50. I.R.C. § 367(a) (2003).
51. See Treas. Reg. § 1.367(a)-3(a), (c) (2004); Lemein & McDonald, supra note
49, at 7-8; Tello, supra note 3, at 164.
52. See Treasury Report, supra note 7, at 8.
53. See Tello, supra note 3, at 167. The McDermott and Helen of Troy inver-
sion transactions attracted significant attention in the United States. Id. at 167
n.66; see supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
54. There are four requirements that must be met for a transfer of stock to es-
cape taxation. First, the new foreign stock received by the shareholders must be less
than 50% of the total voting power and total stock value of the foreign corporation.
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Section 367(a) may thus impose a tax cost to shareholders
and act as a disincentive for inversion transactions. In a stock
market decline such as has occurred in recent years, however,
many shareholders will see little if any realized gains.55 Thus,
in low stock markets, the section 367(a) costs may be greatly
outweighed by the present value of future tax savings from the
inversion.56  This imbalance may be true even in "bull" stock
markets since the expected tax savings of inverted corporations
have been so large.5 7
Conversely, in an asset transfer inversion transaction, the
U.S. corporation is taxed on gains recognized on any assets
transferred.58 The gain is calculated as if the assets had been
sold at the time of the transaction for their fair market value. 59
The shareholders are not taxed on their transfer of stock, and
will hold the shares of the foreign parent with the same basis
that they had in the stock of the U.S. corporation.60
4. Corporate Governance Concerns
An inversion transaction may also raise corporate govern-
ance concerns for shareholders by weakening shareholder
rights. If the parent corporation is moved to a foreign jurisdic-
tion, such as Bermuda, the inverted corporation becomes subject
to the corporate governance laws of Bermuda and is no longer
subject to the laws of the state of the former U.S. parent.61 This
change in law may create problems for shareholders if the cor-
porate governance laws of the foreign jurisdiction are more lax
than the laws of the former U.S. jurisdiction. In Bermuda, for
example, there are major problems with laws affecting share-
Treas. Reg. § 1.367(a)-3(c)(1)(i) (2004). Second, 50% or less of the total voting power
and total stock value of the foreign corporation is owned by former directors, officers,
or 5% shareholders of the U.S. corporation. Id. § 1.367(a)-3(c)(1)(ii). Third, each 5%
shareholder must enter into a "gain recognition agreement." Id. § 1.367(a)-
3(c)(1)(iii)(B). Finally, the foreign corporation must satisfy an active trade or busi-
ness requirement. Id. § 1.367(a)-3(c)(3). For a detailed explanation of the inversion
regulations requirements, see Tello, supra note 3, at 168-70.
55. See Brewer, supra note 42, at 605-06.
56. See id. at 605.
57. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
58. I.R.C. § 367(a) (2003); Treasury Report, supra note 7, at 9.
59. Treasury Report, supra note 7, at 9.
60. I.R.C. §§ 358(a), 1223(1) (2003); Treasury Report, supra note 7, at 9. In or-
der for the shareholders to avoid tax liability on their share transfer, the transfer
must qualify as a section 368 reorganization. See Treas. Reg. § 1.367(a)-3(a), (d)(3)
(Example 12) (2004); Treasury Report, supra note 7, at 9.
61. See Treasury Report, supra note 7, at 16-17.
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holder rights, including: (i) a general inaccessibility of the law,
since court decisions are not assembled and publicly reported;
(ii) an absence of limitations on insider trading; (iii) no require-
ments of prior shareholder approval before a corporation enters
into major actions such as selling assets; and (iv) the restriction
on shareholder derivative suits. 62
C. EFFECTS OF INVERSION TRANSACTIONS ON THE U.S.
GOVERNMENT: EROSION OF THE U.S. TAX BASE
As a result of the number of recent inversions 63 and the in-
verted companies' reduction in U.S. tax liabilities,64 inversion
transactions are likely reducing U.S. corporate tax revenues.
These revenues are vital because the U.S. government depends
on corporate taxes for about 9% of its total revenue. 65 While
there is some disagreement over the extent to which inversion
transactions cost the government, 6  there is little doubt that if
the number of inversions increases, U.S. tax revenues may sub-
stantially decrease. 67 In addition, as inverted corporations shift
activities to foreign jurisdictions, tax compliance may de-
crease. 68 The fear of declining tax revenues has even led many
to challenge the patriotism of corporations that undergo inver-
62. Corporate Inversions: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 107th Cong. 32-34 (2002) (statement of the American Federation of Labor -
Congress of Industrial Organizations).
63. See supra text accompanying note 5.
64. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
65. Robert T. Kudrle, Are There Two Sides to the Tax Haven Issue? (forthcom-
ing).
66. See Corporate Inversion: Hearing on S. 2119 Before the Senate Subcomm.
on Treasury and General Government of the Comm. on Appropriations, 107th Cong.
10 (Oct. 16, 2002) (statement of Pamela Olson, Dept. of the Treasury) (stating that
inversions cost the government "billions" annually); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Commen-
tary, 53 TAX L. REV. 167, 172 (2000) (stating that recent studies have shown a 15%
drop in the effective foreign tax rate of U.S.-based MNEs from 1984-92). But see
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the
Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1597 (2000) (stating that U.S. corporate tax
revenue losses have been relatively small); Martin A. Sullivan, The U.S. Congress's
Inversion Odyssey: Oh, the Places You'll Go, 27 TAx NOTES INT'L 150, 151 (2002)
("Using revenue estimates as guides, corporate inversion activity in dollar terms is
not even a billion dollar a year issue.").
67. See Samuel C. Thompson, Jr., IRC Section 367: A 'Wimp' for Inversions and
a 'Bully' for Real Cross-Border Acquisitions, 26 TAx NOTES INT'L 587, 598 (2002)
("[I]f Congress and the Treasury do not act quickly to address this situation, there
will be a significant erosion in the corporate income tax base.").
68. See Kudrle & Eden, supra note 13, at 44 (citing U.S. General Accounting
Office estimates that tax compliance rates of 90% drop to 30% for foreign-source in-
come due to the absence of withholding or effective information exchange).
2004]
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sion transactions.69
II. INVERSION TRANSACTIONS: PROPOSED REFORMS
In response to the recent increase in inversion transac-
tions,70 many lawmakers and commentators have called for leg-
islation to end the practice.7 1 While some argue that the best
course is simply to do nothing,72 the potential decrease in U.S.
tax revenues 73 and the concerns over corporate governance 74
weigh in favor of taking action to halt inversion transactions.
This section will survey various proposed reforms to stop or de-
crease inversion activity. It will further list the generally cited
advantages and disadvantages of each reform.
A. CUTTING CORPORATE TAXES
The existing U.S. corporate tax rate of 35%75 has been cited
as a cause of inversion transactions. 76  Perhaps the most
straightforward solution to inversion transactions would be to
simply lower this rate.77 Tax cuts of sufficient proportion would
69. See Brewer, supra note 42, at 607-08; Johnston, supra note 41, at Al (stat-
ing that a partner with an accounting firm has cited patriotism criticisms as the
only potential problem to inversion decisions). Congress's view that inversion trans-
actions are unpatriotic is apparent from the titles of many bills introduced in re-
sponse to inversion activity. See Corporate Patriot Enforcement Act, H.R. 3884,
107th Cong. (2002); Save America's Jobs Act, H.R. 3922, 107th Cong. (2002); Uncle
Sam Wants You Act, H.R. 4756, 107th Cong. (2002); No Tax Breaks for Corporations
Renouncing America Bill, H.R. 4993, 107th Cong. (2002). House Bill 3884 actually
makes September 11, 2001, its retrospective effective date. H.R. 3884.
70. See supra text accompanying notes 3-5.
71. See Samuel C. Thompson, Jr., Inversion Hearings Focus on Wrong Issues, -
27 TAx NOTES INT'L 193, 194 (2002) ("[I]t would be irresponsible for Congress to de-
cide not to immediately shut down inversions.").
72. See Corporate Inversions Reveal Deeper Tax Code Flaws, Cato Analysts Say,
27 TAX NOTES INT'L 178, 178 (2002) [hereinafter Cato Analysts]; Daniel J. Mitchell,
Corporate Expatriation Protects American Jobs, HERITAGE FOUND., (2002) at
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Taxes/em829.cfm (arguing that there should be no
legislation adverse to inversions so that corporations can legally invert and take ad-
vantage of "self-help" territoriality).
73. See supra text accompanying notes 63-69.
74. See supra Part I.B.4.
75. I.R.C. § 11 (1986).
76. See Bartlett, supra note 46 (stating that Congress should lower the corpo-
rate tax rate because the "inversion phenomenon should be viewed as a warning
that U.S. [corporate] rates are too high"); Cato Analysts, supra note 72, at 178.
77. See Scott A. Hodge, The Economics of H.R. 5095, TAX FOUND., (2002), at
http://www.taxfoundation.org/hr5095.html (arguing that a tax decrease as low as 5%
would prevent most inversion transactions).
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reduce U.S. corporations' tax liabilities, removing the benefit of
inversions. 78 Yet, while this may discourage inversion transac-
tions, it would only further lower U.S. tax revenues. 79 Thus, it
would only exacerbate the undesirable consequences of inver-
sion transactions. Because this is probably not a viable solution,
few commentators have advocated this approach.
B. REDOMESTICATION
Several members of Congress have proposed legislation to
treat inverted corporations as U.S. corporations for U.S. tax
purposes.8 0 This change in tax definition is termed "redomesti-
cation."8' Each of these bills defines an inversion transaction as
one in which (i) a foreign corporation acquires substantially all
of the shares or assets of a U.S. corporation, and (ii) more than
50% or 80% (depending on the bill) of the foreign corporation's
stock is held by former shareholders of the U.S. corporation.8 2
In addition, some of the bills require that the foreign corporate
group not have "substantial business activities" in its country of
incorporation.8 3
The main benefit of the redomestication approach is that it
offers a bright line test that effectively stops the reduction of
U.S. tax revenues by inversion transactions. This approach,
however, presents several additional problems. First, as cur-
rently proposed, the redomestication reform fails to address the
problem of start-up companies that incorporate in no-tax or low-
tax jurisdictions from the beginning, even though most of their
business is located in the United States. s4 The start-up prob-
78. A corporate tax reduction could also (i) make the U.S. tax rate comparable
to those of major trading partners, (ii) reduce the domestic costs to U.S. exporters,
making their products more competitive in the global market, (iii) encourage multi-
national corporations to increase the amount of dividends that they send back to the
United States, and (iv) serve as an incentive for more foreign direct investment in
the United States. See id.
79. See supra text accompanying notes 63-69.
80. See Corporate Patriot Enforcement Act, H.R. 3884, 107th Cong. (2002);
H.R. 3857, 107th Cong. (2002); Save America's Jobs Act, H.R. 3922, 107th Cong.
(2002); Uncle Sam Wants You Act, H.R. 4756, 107th Cong. (2002); S. 2050, 107th
Cong. (2002); Reversing the Expatriation of Profits Offshore Act, S. 2119, 107th
Cong. (2002).
81. See Lee A. Sheppard, Preventing Corporate Inversions, 95 TAX NOTES 29, 30
(2002).
82. Avi-Yonah, supra note 5, at 227.
83. See, e.g., Reversing the Expatriation of Profits Offshore Act, S. 2119, 107th
Cong. (2002).
84. See Peterson & Cohen, supra note 5, at 180. Today, it is common for start-
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lem, however, could probably be solved by a modification of the
domestication approach, as advocated by Robert Kudrle.8 5 The
United States could refuse to recognize incorporation in a for-
eign jurisdiction if a minimum amount of the corporation's
shares are not owned by the foreign jurisdiction's citizens.8 6
Kudrle does not address the danger that a corporation legiti-
mately incorporated in a foreign jurisdiction could fail the test
if, for some reason, its shareholders are not primarily citizens of
that jurisdiction.8 7 Still, by setting the citizenship requirement
at an appropriate threshold, say 5%, legitimate incorporations
could be protected. Inverted corporations would be denied in-
corporation because the capital required for citizens of a no-tax
or low-tax country like Bermuda to own 5% of a MNE's shares
would be too high.88
Both of these reforms present several problems. First, the
citizenship requirements may be difficult to administer and en-
force since publicly-traded shares constantly change hands.8 9
Second, the "substantial business activities" requirement of
some bills90 is somewhat vague.91 Disagreement over what con-
stitutes "substantial business activities" could lead to increasing
litigation.92 Finally, the redomestication bills may be politically
unfeasible because, despite substantial support,93 none were ul-
timately passed by Congress. 94
up companies that are likely to become MNEs to consider incorporating in no-tax or
low-tax jurisdictions from the beginning. See Brewer, supra note 42, at 604. More-
over, limiting inversion reform to the definition used in the redomestication bill may
actually encourage more start-up companies to incorporate in foreign jurisdictions.
See Treasury Report, supra note 7, at 20.
85. See Kudrle, supra note 65, at 8.
86. See id.
87. Id.
88. E-mail from Robert T. Kudrle, Professor, University of Minnesota, to John
Kelly (Nov. 14, 2003, 19:45 CST) (on file with author).
89. Avi-Yonah, supra note 5, at 228.
90. See, e.g., Reversing the Expatriation of Profits Offshore Act, S. 2119, 107th
Cong. (2002).
91. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 5, at 228.
92. See id.
93. See Thompson, supra note 71, at 194 (stating that Congress should imme-
diately adopt S. 2119). House Bill 4993 had 93 co-sponsors. Sullivan, supra note 66,
at 154.
94. The bills were dropped after lobbying by business groups and complaints by
House Republicans. See John D. McKinnon & John Harwood, Tax Shelters Come
Under Fire: Democrats Push Crackdowns, Hope to Cut Bush Approval Ratings,
WALL ST. J., June 6, 2003, at A4.
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C. CHANGING THE DEFINITION OF HEADQUARTERS: THE
"MANAGED AND CONTROLLED" TEST
Another proposed reform is the "managed and controlled"
test of corporate residence, similar to the standard used in the
United Kingdom. 95 Under this approach, a corporation's resi-
dence for U.S. tax purposes would be changed from the place of
incorporation to the jurisdiction in which it is managed and con-
trolled.96 Most commentators, however, agree that the United
States should not adopt the identical U.K. version, which gener-
ally treats the location of board meetings as the residence. 97
The U.K. standard has been abused by corporations hiring out-
side directors who stage meetings in the jurisdiction of incorpo-
ration while the corporation's operations take place elsewhere. 98
Few boards mind meeting a few times a year in a tax haven
such as Bermuda. 99 Instead, most commentators advocating the
"managed and controlled" test contend that it should focus on
the jurisdiction in which the principal officers of a corporation
manage the business on a daily basis. 100
The benefit of this approach is that since few inverted com-
panies manage their operations from the foreign parent jurisdic-
tion, inverted companies operating primarily in the United
States would still be subject to U.S. taxes. 10 1 This tax treatment
would make inversion transactions pointless. 102 Another benefit
of this approach is that it would be hard to avoid or abuse be-
cause it would be very costly for principal officers, both person-
ally and monetarily, to move to a foreign jurisdiction to run an
inverted corporation.103 Furthermore, unlike the redomestica-
tion approach, this test applies to start-up companies incorpo-
rating in foreign jurisdictions from the beginning.104
While the "managed and controlled" test would be consis-
95. See Finance Act, 1988, c. 39, § 66, sched. 7 (Eng.).
96. Peterson & Cohen, supra note 5, at 184.
97. See id.
98. Sheppard, supra note 81, at 31. Interestingly, the United Kingdom has
now supplemented the "managed and controlled" test with a place of incorporation
test. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 5, at 229.
99. Avi-Yonah, supra note 5, at 229.
100. See id.; Peterson & Cohen, supra note 5, at 184.
101. Avi-Yonah, supra note 5, at 229.
102. Because of the "managed and controlled" test, there have been relatively
few inversion transactions in Europe. Id. at 229 n.37.
103. Id. at 229.
104. Id.; Peterson & Cohen, supra note 5, at 184.
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tent with international norms, 105 it would be a radical change
from traditional U.S. tax policy. 10 6 Moreover, unlike the redo-
mestication approach, this test does not offer a bright line
test.107 In large MNEs, officers may perform a number of differ-
ent duties in different countries. Finally, this test may present
a disincentive for MNEs to manage operations in the United
States, since it would cause them to become subject to U.S.
taxes. 108 The domestic management of MNEs confers substan-
tial benefits on the United States apart from corporate income
taxes. 109
D. PROHIBITING FEDERAL CONTRACTS WITH INVERTED
CORPORATIONS
A few recent bills have proposed banning federal contracts
with inverted corporations. The Reclaiming Expatriated Con-
tracts and Profits Act attempted to ban all federal contracts
with inverted corporations. 110 In addition, the initial Homeland
Security Bill banned the U.S. Department of Homeland Security
from contracting with inverted corporations.' These proposals
would provide a substantial disincentive for corporations con-
sidering inversions. 112 Like other inversion bills, however, these
bills may be politically infeasible because they never manage to
get passed into law." 3 Also, since these bills use the same defi-
nition of inverted corporations as the redomestication bills, they
are faced with the same problems: determining shareholder
residency, failure to address start-up corporations, and vague-
ness in the "substantial business activities" prong." 4
105. Peterson & Cohen, supra note 5, at 184.
106. Id.; Avi-Yonah, supra note 5, at 229.
107. Avi-Yonah, supra note 5, at 229.
108. See Peterson & Cohen, supra note 5, at 184.
109. See id. (stating that the benefits of U.S. management of MNEs include the
employment of executives who pay U.S. taxes, the use of U.S. services in other in-
dustries, and the support for charities and cultural institutions).
110. See S. 3120, 107th Cong. (2002); Amy Hamilton, Finance Asks: Is Accenture
an Expatriate?, 98 TAX NOTES 894, 894-95 (2003).
111. H.R. 5005, 107th Cong. (2002); Patti Mohr, Corporate Inversion Language
Stripped From Homeland Security Bill, 31 TAX NOTES INT'L 1148, 1148 (2003). The
Homeland Security issue was later revisited when a Homeland Security funding bill
again attempted to ban federal contracts with the agency. Id.
112. See Mohr, supra note 111, at 1149 (quoting Congressman Richard E. Neal,
who stated that inverted corporations win $2 billion a year in federal contracts).
113. See id. at 1148; Kudrle & Eden, supra note 13, at 68 n.5.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 82-83.
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E. DIFFERENTIAL TAX TREATMENT FOR INVERTED
CORPORATIONS
Some proposals have attempted to increase U.S. taxes on
certain components of inverted corporations. One approach is to
impose a surtax on the dividends or the proceeds of stock sales
of inverted corporations. 115 This tax increase would impose a
substantial disincentive for inversions and recapture some of
the lost U.S. revenues. While this approach appears credible,
there have been no proposals as to what criteria would be used
to define an inverted corporation.
A second reform, proposed in the American Competitiveness
and Corporate Accountability Bill, would impose a 20% excise
tax on all stock options held by executives and directors of an
inverted corporation. 116 This tax would provide a disincentive
specifically for those in the position to make the inversion
transaction decision. 117 Those with stock options, however, have
an interest in seeing their share prices increase, and an increase
in share prices due to a post-inversion reduction in tax liabilities
might outweigh the costs of the tax. 118
F. REFORMING SECTION 163(J) FOR EARNINGS STRIPPING
In its 2002 report, the U.S. Treasury Department suggested
several changes to section 163(0) in order to decrease earnings
stripping. 1' 9 First, the Treasury suggested comparing the debt-
equity ratio of a U.S. subsidiary to the debt-equity ratio of the
worldwide group of which it is a part to determine whether the
U.S. corporation is leveraged disproportionately. 20 Alterna-
tively, the Treasury suggested that the debt-equity ratio could
be eliminated, and the allowable interest deduction calculation
could be made solely by comparing interest expense to taxable
income.' 21 In addition, the Treasury further suggested reducing
115. See Kudrle, supra note 65, at 8.
116. H.R. 5095, 107th Cong. (2002).
117. See Peterson & Cohen, supra note 5, at 186.
118. Id.; see discussion supra Part I.B.2 (discussing the increase of share prices
following an inversion transaction).
119. See Treasury Report, supra note 7, at 22-25; supra text accompanying notes
33-37.
120. Treasury Report, supra note 7, at 23.
121. Id. The treasury stated that the 1.5 to 1 debt-equity ratio "effectively oper-
ates as a safe harbor for corporations with debt-equity ratios of 1.5 to 1 or lower."
Id.
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the 50% limitation on adjustable taxable income. 22 Finally, the
Treasury suggested rethinking the indefinite carryforward of
each year's non-deductible interest expense. 123 Recently, the
American Competitiveness and Corporate Accountability Bill
proposed similar reforms. 124
Reforming section 1630) as the Treasury suggested could
substantially fix the underlying tax rule inadequacy and curb
earnings stripping by inverted corporations. Some commenta-
tors, however, argue that the proposed reforms are much too
broad. 125 Since the rule and proposed reform do not consider the
reasons behind a U.S. subsidiary's above-average debt level,
firms with a legitimate purpose behind their high debt levels
that are not engaging in earnings stripping could be affected.126
This concern is further exacerbated if the 50% limitation on ad-
justable taxable income is tightened. 127 At the same time, this
reform may be too narrow for the inversion problem. While it
may help to prevent interest earnings stripping, the Treasury's
proposal does not address deductions for payments on intangible
assets.128 This reform also does not address inverted corpora-
tions' ability to avoid U.S. taxes on foreign operations. 129
122. Id.
123. Id. at 23-24.
124. H.R. 5095, 107th Cong. (2002). The bill proposed the following changes: (i)
eliminate the 1.5 to 1 debt-equity ratio requirement, (ii) reduce the carryforward al-
lowance to five years, and (iii) reduce the acceptable deductible interest expense
from 50% to 35%. Id.
125. See Peterson & Cohen, supra note 5, at 187-88; cf. Cato Analysts, supra
note 72, at 178 (citing Dan Mitchell of the Heritage Foundation who argued that the
Treasury's reforms would discourage foreign firms from investing capital in the
United States).
126. See Peterson & Cohen, supra note 5, at 187-88. For example, the U.S. sub-
sidiary might have incurred the debt in order to finance an acquisition, or the U.S.
subsidiary might be engaged in a different industry that typically incurs greater
debt than the rest of the worldwide group. Id. at 188. In order to partially mitigate
these concerns, Peterson & Cohen suggest providing a "business purpose exception"
to § 1630). Id. at 187-88.
127. See id. (stating that reducing the interest limitation from 50% to 30% would
cause the United States to have tighter restrictions on interest deductibility than
any of its major trading partners). The Treasury itself cautioned that tightening
debt thresholds may be problematic since business cycle fluctuations could substan-
tially change a corporation's taxable income, thus impacting interest deductions of
corporations not engaging in earnings stripping. See Treasury Report, supra note 7,
at 23.
128. See Sullivan, supra note 66, at 154.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 27-30.
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G. TERRITORIAL TAX SYSTEM
Many commentators believe that inversion transactions are
merely a symptom of fundamental flaws in U.S. international
tax policy, and that broader reforms are needed. 130 An oft-cited
reform would have the United States switch from its modified
worldwide taxation system to a territorial system. 13 1 Generally,
the United States taxes income of its corporate residents at U.S.
rates regardless of where income is earned, giving credits for
any foreign taxes paid. 132 A territorial system would only tax
"source" income earned within U.S. borders, exempting foreign
income. 133 Since one effect of inversion transactions is to shield
foreign income from U.S. taxes,134 inversions can thus be seen as
a way for corporations to achieve de facto territorial taxation. 35
From this line of reasoning, a move to a territorial system
could eliminate a substantial benefit of inversion transactions.
This reform would affect U.S. corporations considering inversion
transactions as well as start-ups choosing the jurisdiction in
which to incorporate.1 36 In addition, proponents of a territorial
system argue that a switch would increase the global competi-
tiveness of U.S. MNEs. Many European and Asian countries
operate under territorial systems. 137 Unlike U.S. MNEs, MNEs
in territorial countries benefit from reduced taxes on operations
in lower tax jurisdictions. 138 By switching to a system in which
foreign income may be taxed at a lower rate, U.S. MNEs could
130. See generally Karen B. Brown, U.S. International Tax Administration &
Developing Nations: Administrative Policy at the Crossroads, 35 GEO. WASH. INT'L L.
REV. 393 (2003) (outlining a number of deficiencies in U.S. international tax policy);
Michael J. Graetz, Taxing International Income: Inadequate Principles, Outdated
Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 54 TAX L. REV. 261 (2001) (arguing that the
U.S. international tax system is inadequate, outdated, and needs reexamination).
131. See, e.g., Brewer, supra note 42, at 609.
132. I.R.C. § 901 (2001).
133. See id.
134. See supra text accompanying notes 27-30.
135. See Peterson & Cohen, supra note 5, at 180; Thompson, supra note 67, at
589.
136. A territorial system could largely remove taxation as a consideration in the
decision where to incorporate. See Brewer, supra note 42, at 609. Taking into ac-
count non-tax factors, a territorial system could make the United States a choice ju-
risdiction for the incorporation of MNE parents. Id. This possibility may be one
reason why some economists estimate that switching to a territorial system would
increase U.S. tax revenues by up to seven billion dollars annually. See Peterson &
Cohen, supra note 5, at 181.
137. See Gale, supra note 24, at 1503 (stating that about half of OECD countries
operate under territorial systems); Peterson & Cohen, supra note 5, at 182.
138. See Peterson & Cohen, supra note 5, at 180.
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lower prices and capture a greater market share. 139
Competitiveness issues aside, the chief problem with the
territorial tax system reform is that it ignores the U.S. tax reve-
nue problems associated with inversion transactions. 140 A terri-
torial system may simply legitimize moving operations to low-
tax jurisdictions, making it harder to protect the U.S. income
tax base. 141 In addition, a territorial system may actually do lit-
tle to prevent inversion transactions. Earnings stripping would
continue to act as an incentive for U.S. corporations to incorpo-
rate in foreign jurisdictions.142 Finally, a switch to a territorial
system would be a difficult and costly transition for the United
States. 143
H. CONSUMPTION TAX SYSTEM
Another proposed fundamental tax reform is to switch to a
broad-based, consumption tax system, such as the value-added
tax (VAT), 144 or a national retail sales tax (NRST).145 In gen-
eral, instead of taxing foreign income, these systems would tax
all MNEs on sales of goods in the United States. 146 Like a terri-
139. See supra text accompanying notes 42-43; Treasury Report, supra note 7, at
19. A question remains, however, how much increasing the competitiveness of U.S.
MNEs would benefit the U.S. economy. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 5, at 226-27.
140. See supra text accompanying notes 63-69.
141. See Gale, supra note 24, at 1496 ("Going to a territorial system as a re-
sponse to corporate inversions is like choosing to reduce the crime rate by legalizing
certain crimes.").
142. See Lee A. Sheppard, Preventing Corporate Inversions, Part 3, 95 TAX
NOTES 1864, 1867 (2002); Sullivan, supra note 66, at 152; supra text accompanying
notes 31-43.
143. See Gale, supra note 24, at 1503 (stating that a transition to a territorial
tax system would present difficult issues with respect to deferred income, deferred
losses, accumulated tax credits, and the renegotiation of tax treaties). A territorial
system may turn out to be quite complex in enforcement. See id.
144. The VAT would tax corporations on the difference between the value of the
sales of goods and the costs of the purchase of goods. Gale, supra note 24, at 1504.
For an innovative modification of the consumption system, see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah,
Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 HARv.
L. REV. 1573, 1670-74 (2000). Avi-Yonah proposes withholding taxes in the "de-
mand" jurisdiction based initially on sales volume convertible into credits for corpo-
rate tax liability. Id.
145. The NRST would tax corporations on the value of all sales to consumers.
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the
Welfare State, 113 HARv. L. REV. 1573, 1670-74 (2000).
146. See generally John K. McNulty, Flat Tax, Consumption Tax, Consumption.
Type Income Tax Proposals in the United States: A Tax Policy Discussion of Funda-
mental Tax Reform, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2095 (2000) (presenting a detailed discussion of
a number of consumption tax reforms).
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torial tax system, a consumption system would remove many of
the incentives of inversion transactions. Proponents of the sys-
tem argue that corporations, without having to worry about
high U.S. taxes on foreign income, would make the United
States their jurisdiction of incorporation and corporate head-
quarters. 14 7 Because of the strength of U.S. consumer demand,
proponents maintain that this system would increase U.S. tax
revenues and significantly expand the U.S. economy.1 48
Still, a consumption system may also cause problems for the
United States. Under a consumption system, some U.S. MNEs
could see large increases in their U.S. tax liability,14 9 which may
present competitiveness issues as previously discussed.1 50 Some
commentators also question whether a switch would reduce do-
nations to organizations such as charities and universities.151
In addition, as with the territorial system reform, a transition to
a consumption system may be difficult and entail substantial
costs.152
I. WORLDWIDE PRESSURE ON TAX HAVENS
A more straightforward proposal to combat inversion trans-
actions may be an agreement with low-tax or no-tax jurisdic-
tions to limit tax competition.153 For instance, if developed
countries and low-tax or no-tax countries could form a multilat-
eral agreement that sets a baseline for corporate tax rates, the
foreign income benefits from inversion transactions would es-
sentially disappear. 54 Moreover, a tax rate floor would not
147. See Sullivan, supra note 66, at 151; supra note 133 and accompanying text.
148. See Gale, supra note 24, at 1505 (stating that papers have suggested that
replacing the U.S. tax system with a "clean, broad-based, low-rate" consumption tax
system would expand the U.S. economy by 1-2% over ten to fifteen years).
149. For example, it has been estimated that under a 19% flat tax, General Mo-
tors' tax liability in 1993 would have risen from $110 million to $2.7 billion, an in-
crease that could even be larger under a VAT. Gale, supra note 24, at 1505.
150. See supra notes 42-43, 134-36 and accompanying text.
151. See Sullivan, supra note 66, at 151-52.
152. See Gale, supra note 24, at 1506.
153. See generally Joel Slemrod, Tax Principles in an International Economy, in
WORLD TAX REFORM: CASE STUDIES OF DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 21
(Michael J. Boskin & Charles E. McLure, Jr. eds. 1990).
154. See Joel Slemrod & Reuven Avi-Yonah, (How) Should Trade Agreements
Deal With Income Tax Issues?, 55 TAX L. REV. 533, 552 (2002). This approach was
essentially recommended for the European Union by the Ruding Committee in 1992.
See Commission of European Communities, Report of the Committee of Independent
Experts on Company Taxation 203-04 (1992), available at LEXIS, 93 TNI 34-8.
This approach, however, was never accepted. See Slemrod & Avi-Yonah, supra, at
553.
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harm tax revenues of developing countries, as may be the case
with a consumption tax system.155 Most tax haven activity con-
tributes almost no income to low-tax or no-tax jurisdictions. 156
Because of efficient communication advances, incorporation in
tax havens requires little human capital.157 Any benefits to tax
havens come from small fees and taxes. 158
It is doubtful, however, whether many no-tax or low-tax
countries would agree to a multilateral agreement on tax
rates. 59 These countries may be hesitant to give up their sover-
eignty over tax policy. 16 0 Furthermore, while low-tax or no-tax
countries obtain little benefit from being tax havens, they do
gain some benefit. 161 Of course, developed countries could im-
pose sanctions if countries refuse to cooperate, 6 2 or else they
could offer aid or trade benefits. The question then, however, is
what body would enforce the agreement. The Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), with only
twenty-nine mostly developed member countries, may simply
not be acceptable to low-tax or no-tax jurisdictions. 16 3 While the
WTO is a much broader organization, some argue that it lacks
sufficient tax expertise. 6 4 Collectively, these problems make
the feasibility of a multilateral tax agreement doubtful.
155. For a brief discussion of a consumption tax system's effects on developing
countries, see supra text accompanying notes 146-47.
156. See Kudrle, supra note 65, at 12 (stating that as an income transfer mecha-
nism, tax havens are completely inefficient).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. An OECD effort to form a multilateral agreement on international invest-
ment failed partially from a lack of agreement among a number of countries. See
David L. Cleeton, European Commission Releases Estimates of Economic Benefits
From Potential WTO Agreements, 20 TAX NOTES INT'L 261, 262 (2000).
160. The Ruding Commission proposal was rejected primarily because it was
viewed as interfering with countries' ability to determine their own taxes. Kudrle,
supra note 65, at 12. But see Avi-Yonah, supra note 13, at 1692 (stating that this
problem could be mitigated by adopting the GATT regime rule, which requires a
consensus on all decisions).
161. See supra text accompanying notes 153-55.
162. See Slemrod & Avi-Yonah, supra note 154, at 552.
163. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 13, at 1692 (stating that the OECD is "identified
as the rich countries' club").
164. See generally William M. Considine, The DISC Legislation: An Evaluation,
7 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 217 (1974); Robert E. Hudec, Reforming GATTAdjudica-
tion Procedures: The Lessons of the DISC Case, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1443 (1988). But
see Avi-Yonah, supra note 13, at 1690 (stating that this problem could be solved by
the WTO hiring tax experts).
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III. PROPOSED SECURITIES EXCHANGE RULE
PROHIBITING LISTING OF INVERTED CORPORATIONS
U.S. securities exchanges offer issuing corporations unpar-
alleled benefits in listing securities. 165 Yet, it seems unfair that
inverted corporations enjoy these benefits after engaging in in-
version transactions with the primary purpose of avoiding U.S.
tax liability. If U.S. securities exchanges act in concert to enact
a rule prohibiting the listing of corporations or start-up corpora-
tions that undergo inversions transactions, they could act as a
substantial disincentive for these transactions. 166 Because a
prohibited corporation would be deprived of the numerous ad-
vantages of listing on a U.S. exchange, this reform would act as
a significant penalty and effectively end inversion transac-
tions.167
U.S. securities exchanges offer listing corporations access to
considerable amounts of cheap and liquid equity capital. 168 In
addition, access to U.S. markets can enhance a corporation's
visibility and prestige. 169 A U.S. listing also benefits sharehold-
ers. Empirical studies have demonstrated that foreign corpora-
tions' shares typically increase in value when they cross-list on a
U.S. exchange. 170 As a result of these and numerous other bene-
165. See supra text accompanying notes 168-71.
166. A rule enacted by the securities exchanges would be better than one en-
acted by the SEC since an SEC prohibition on the listing of inverted corporations
would likely be struck down by the courts. Cf. Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905
F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding that the SEC had exceeded its authority to regu-
late stock exchanges in promulgating a rule prohibiting the listing of a domestic
company that takes action to restrict voting rights).
167. See Amir N. Licht, Cross-Listing and Corporate Governance: Bonding or
Avoiding?, 4 CHI. J. INT'L L. 141, 147 (2003) (stating that, in the context of corporate
governance listing standards, "issuers will not delist, because they would then lose
the great advantages of listing on the NYSE as the market to which issuers from all
around the world 'herd' to").
168. See id. at 141; James A. Fanto & Roberta S. Karmel, A Report on the Atti-
tudes of Foreign Companies Regarding a U.S. Listing, 3 STAN. J. L. Bus. & FIN. 51,
52, 65 (1997) (stating that foreign companies observed that a U.S. securities listing
was necessary to raise large amounts of equity capital).
169. See Fanto & Karmel, supra note 168, at 65.
170. See Craig Doidge et al., Why are Foreign Firms Listed in the U.S. Worth
More?, SSRN Working Paper (2001), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers
.cfm?abstractid=285337 (last visited Nov. 4, 2003). See generally Gordon Alexander
et al., Asset Pricing and Dual Listing on Foreign Capital Markets: A Note, 42 J. FIN.
151 (1987); Gregory B. Kadlec & John McConnell, The Effect of Market Segmentation
and l1liquidity on Asset Prices: Evidence from Exchange Listings, 49 J. FIN. 611
(1994). One explanation for the increased share price is favorable shareholder rec-
ognition of the more strict disclosure and corporate governance standards in U.S.
exchanges. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global
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fits, 171 the threat of a delisting from a U.S. securities exchange
presents a significant disincentive for inversion transactions
and start-ups that incorporate in foreign jurisdictions.
The purpose of this Note is not to argue that changing secu-
rities exchange listing standards is the best reform. Indeed, this
proposal does not address fundamental U.S. tax policy flaws un-
derlying inversion transactions. 172 It does, however, offer an
immediate, low-cost, and effective solution until the policy flaws
can be remedied. 173
A. MODIFYING LISTING STANDARDS FOR U.S. SECURITIES
EXCHANGES
U.S. securities exchanges operate under a system of gov-
ernment-supervised self-regulation created by the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act). 174 The New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange (AMEX), and
NASDAQ require corporations to enter into listing agreements
in order to list stock.175 These listing agreements are essentially
private contracts between an exchange and an issuer. 76
When proposing a new listing standard, section 19(b) of the
Exchange Act requires a securities exchange to file a copy of the
proposed rule with the SEC for approval. 177 The SEC is re-
quired to approve proposed rules as long as they are consistent
with the requirements of the Exchange Act. 178 Courts have in-
terpreted this "consistency" language to require that rules sat-
Convergence in Corporate Governance and its Implications, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 641,
674 (1999); Licht, supra note 167, at 142.
171. Foreign corporations have also noted that a U.S. listing facilitates U.S. ac-
quisitions and pleases major U.S. strategic partners. See Fanto & Karmel, supra
note 168, at 64-65.
172. See discussion supra Parts ILA, II.B, II.C, II.F, II.G, II.H.
173. See discussion supra Parts I.B.1, II.G, II.H.
174. Codified as 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk; Douglas C. Michael, Untenable Status of
Corporate Governance Listing Standards Under the Securities Exchange Act, 47 Bus.
LAW. 1461, 1461 (1992).
175. Coffee, supra note 170, at 687. Some examples of listing requirements in-
clude minimum standards for market capitalization, minimum number of shares
and shareholders, disclosure rules, and corporate governance standards. Michael,
supra note 174, at 1463-64.
176. American Bar Association, Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities,
Special Study on Market Structure, Listing Standards and Corporate Governance, 57
BUS. LAw. 1487, 1503 (2002) [hereinafter ABA Study].
177. Exchange Act § 19(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(1) (2000). The SEC first pub-
lishes the proposed rule for comment from interested parties, and then considers ap-
proval after the requisite period. Id.
178. Exchange Act § 19(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(2).
[Vo1.14:1
CORPORATE INVERSION TRANSACTIONS
isfy section 6(b),179 particularly section 6(b)(5), of the Act.80
Most of section 6(b) applies to rules regarding securities ex-
changes and members, however, and listing standards for issu-
ers likely must only be "not designed to permit unfair discrimi-
nation between ... issuers."'81 In practice, review of proposed
rules under section 6(b) is quite limited, and the SEC usually
finds that listing standards satisfy sections 19(b) and 6(b).182
U.S. securities exchanges thus have broad power to enact
listing standards. 183 Considering its limited review, the SEC
would probably find that a rule prohibiting the listing of in-
verted corporations is consistent with the Exchange Act. Under
section 6(b)(5), the listing standard would not be designed to
permit "unfair discrimination" against issuers. It would be a
stretch to consider prohibiting corporations that exploit tax
loopholes in order to avoid U.S. tax liability unfair. Adding fur-
ther support to the "consistency" of this proposal is Section 2 of
the Exchange Act, which states that one of the Act's purposes is
the protection of "the Federal taxing power."184
Even if the exchanges have the power to enact a listing
standard prohibiting inverted corporations, there is still a ques-
tion of whether they have any incentive to do so. At first glance,
prohibiting inverted corporations seems to help the U.S. gov-
ernment maintain tax revenues. It is, however, in the ex-
changes' best interests to preserve a positive public image. 8 5
179. Exchange Act § 6(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b).
180. See, e.g., Clement v. SEC, 674 F.2d 641, 646 (7th Cir. 1982); see also ABA
Study, supra note 176, at 1518-20.
181. Exchange Act § 6(b)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(5); see ABA Study, supra note
176, at 1520 (stating that a Task Force of the American Bar Association found the
nondiscrimination standard to be the only limitation on a securities exchange adopt-
ing corporate governance listing requirements) (internal citations omitted). The leg-
islative history of section 19(b) demonstrates that Congress was primarily concerned
with the SEC's supervision of exchange rules relating to members, not listing stan-
dards. See S. Rep. No. 94-75, at 30-32 (1975).
182. See Michael, supra note 174, at 1479; Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905
F.2d, 406, 414 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (stating that the SEC's § 19 powers, which do not
regulate members and are not related to the purposes of the Exchange Act, are quite
limited).
183. As long as a proposed listing standard is not inconsistent with the Ex-
change Act, it probably does not need to have anything to do with the Act. See Busi-
ness Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 414-15.
184. Exchange Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (2000).
185. In the past, the exchanges themselves have recognized the great impor-
tance of their public image. See Joel Seligman, Equal Protection in Shareholder Vot-
ing Rights: The One Common Share, One Vote Controversy, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
687, 698 (1986) (suggesting that the primary reason behind the NYSE's decision to
preserve a voting rights rule was a "concern about public opinion").
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This image is especially important considering how many have
challenged the patriotism of inverted corporations following the
September 11th terrorist attacks.1 8 6 Even if the incentives are
insufficient, the SEC has shown considerable influence in per-
suading exchanges to adopt listing standards in the past.18 7 Us-
ing its influence, the SEC could push the exchanges to adopt
this reform.
Perhaps a more significant problem is that, over the long
term, this reform may decrease the competitiveness of U.S. ex-
changes and cause corporations to shift their listings to foreign
exchanges or Alternative Trading Systems (ATSs).188 Indeed,
technological developments have facilitated the growth of for-
eign exchanges, causing them to compete increasingly with U.S.
exchanges.18 9 The numerous benefits of a U.S. listing, 190 how-
ever, may outweigh the cost savings from an inversion transac-
tion. Perhaps more telling is that, despite stricter listing stan-
dards than most foreign exchanges, 191 the number of foreign
securities on U.S. exchanges continues to grow.1 92
This reform would offer an effective remedy to the inversion
problem. The costs of being delisted from a U.S. exchange
would present a major disincentive to incorporating in a foreign
jurisdiction.193 While the reform acts as a penalty and does not
186. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
187. See Robert B. Thompson, Collaborative Corporate Governance: Listing
Standards, State Law and Federal Regulation, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 961, 977-
79, 981 (2003) (describing how the SEC has persuaded U.S. securities exchanges to
adopt corporate governance listing standards).
188. ATSs are private, for profit electronic trading networks that have been in-
creasingly competing with U.S. securities exchanges. ABA Study, supra note 176, at
1533-37. ATSs do not impose listing standards. Id.
189. See id. at 1538. The ABA Study reports that twenty-five years ago corpora-
tions that traded on the NYSE accounted for 80% of the world's capitalization value,
while in 2000, the North American region accounted for only 50% of the world's capi-
talization value. Id. (citing Noelle Knox, NYSE Expects More Foreign Stocks, AP
ONLINE, Jan. 13, 1999; Int'l Fed'n of Stock Exchs., Evolution of Market Capitaliza-
tion by Time Zone 73, available at http://www.fibv.com).
190. See supra text accompanying notes 168-71.
191. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
192. See Gerard A. Achstatter, Foreign Companies Flock to the U.S. But Their
Stocks Carry Extra Risks, INVESTOR'S BUS. DAILY, June 2, 1998, at A-7 (noting a
50% rise in foreign listings from 1995 to 1998); Fanto & Karmel, supra note 168, at
59.
193. For a discussion of the benefits of listing on U.S. securities exchanges, see
supra notes 168-71 and accompanying text. The costs of being delisted are so great
that some courts have held that delisting constitutes irreparable harm to the share-
holders and is grounds for an injunction. See Gearhart Indus., Inc. v. Smith Int'l,
Inc., 741 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1984). But see Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datalab,
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address the fundamental U.S. tax issues underlying inversion
transactions, 194 it can at least be used until the tax policies and
traditions, if ever, are changed.
B. TEST FOR INVERTED CORPORATIONS
In order for U.S. securities exchanges to make this reform
workable, the exchanges must formulate a test that can distin-
guish between legitimate foreign issuers and inverted corpora-
tions.195 This Note proposes a flexible, two-part disjunctive test.
Specifically, in order to list its securities on a U.S. exchange, a
foreign corporation could prove that either (1) a certain percent-
age, say 5%, of its shareholders reside in the jurisdiction of in-
corporation, or (2) that the principal officers "manage and con-
trol" the corporation on a daily basis in the jurisdiction of
incorporation. Prong (1) uses the test advocated by Robert T.
Kudrle, 196 while prong (2) uses the "managed and controlled"
test described in Part I.D.3.197 In order to prevent this standard
from being easily circumvented and to avoid any costly monitor-
ing body, the burden could be placed on a corporation to prove it
has satisfied one of the two requirements.
The test provides a straightforward standard that would be
difficult to avoid either by inverted corporations or start-ups in-
corporating in a low-tax or no-tax jurisdiction. If a corporation
undergoes an inversion transaction it will be threatened with
delisting.198 Similarly, a start-up incorporating in a low-tax or
no-tax jurisdiction can be barred from listing stock in the first
place. Under prong (1), inverted corporations would be denied a
listing because the capital required for citizens of a no-tax or
low-tax country to own the requisite percentage of a large corpo-
ration's shares would be too high.1 99 As long as ownership
threshold is set at the right level, companies legitimately incor-
Inc., 722 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1983) (denying injunction).
194. See discussion supra Parts I.B.1, II.G, H.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 84-88.
196. See supra text accompanying note 86.
197. See supra text accompanying notes 95-100.
198. Section 12(d) of the Exchange Act requires delistings to be approved by the
SEC. Exchange Act § 12(d), 15 U.S.C. § 781(d) (2000). If a security is delisted, sec-
tion 12(a) prohibits transactions in that security on the exchange. Exchange Act §
12 (a), 15 U.S.C. § 781(a). Even if an issuer is delisted, however, U.S. investors may
still purchase its unregistered securities abroad. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.901-230.904
(2004).
199. See supra Part II.B.
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porated in a foreign jurisdiction will likely satisfy prong (1).200
If a legitimate foreign corporation could not satisfy prong
(1), it would still have the opportunity to satisfy prong (2) before
being denied an exchange listing. The "managed and controlled"
test would target inverted corporations because it would be very
costly for principle officers to move to a foreign jurisdiction to
run a corporation.20 1 Moreover, this test could distinguish in-
verted corporations while not radically altering U.S. tax policy,
the primary criticism of using this test as a definition of a corpo-
ration's headquarters. 202 Although evaluating where the princi-
pal officers manage and control a corporation appears somewhat
vague, this test could be workable by objectively defining which
and how many officers it took to "manage and control" a corpo-
ration, and by placing this burden on corporations. 203
One potential problem with this test is that the anonymous,
increasingly rapid trading of shares may make prong (1) diffi-
cult to apply.20 4 Rule 3b-4 under the Exchange Act, however,
currently uses shareholder residency requirements in defining a
"foreign private issuer" with no apparent problems.205 More-
over, since the burden is on corporations to satisfy prong (1),
there should be relatively few enforcement difficulties for securi-
ties exchanges, and the corporations will have a significant in-
centive to devote resources to tracking shareholder residency.
Though the U.S. securities exchanges may seem an unusual
forum for preventing inversions, they offer a unique advantage
in that the enforcement can be performed by the exchanges and
not the government. By placing the burden on corporations to
prove they satisfy one of the two requirements, it would shift
the monitoring costs from taxpayers to foreign issuers. The in-
formation could be submitted by filing for an initial listing or
with required annual reporting.20 6
200. See id.
201. See supra Part I.C.
202. See id.
203. See id.
204. See supra text accompanying note 89.
205. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-4 (2004). The rule provides that a "foreign private is-
suer" may not be an issuer in which "[mlore than 50 percent of the issuer's out-
standing voting securities are directly or indirectly held of record by residents of the
United States." Id.
206. See Exchange Act §§ 12(b)-(f), 13(a)-(b), 15 U.S.C. §§ 781(b)-(g), 78m(a)-(b).
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CONCLUSION
Although inversion transactions have slowed since the Sep-
tember 11th terrorist attacks, it is probably only a matter of
time until they increase again. While it is generally agreed we
need to stop inversion transactions, there may be no easy an-
swer to the problem. Proposed solutions range from narrow
"fixes" in order to quickly stop inversions to fundamental U.S.
tax policy reforms. The best short-term strategy may be a con-
certed U.S. securities exchange rule prohibiting the listing of in-
verted corporations. This concerted effort would offer an imme-
diate and effective remedy to the inversion problem until the
fundamental tax policies can be addressed.
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